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Notes & Comments
The Great Instrument of Chicanery:
An Appeal for Greater Judicial
Scrutiny of Solvent Insurers' Schemes
of Arrangement
J.H. Oliverio*
INTRODUCTION
In 2002 the Rhode Island General Assembly became the first
state legislature to enact a solvent scheme of arrangement law for
solvent insurers and reinsurers by passing the Voluntary
Restructuring of Solvent Insurers Act (the Restructuring Act).1
* J.D. Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2013; B.A.
Providence College, 2010. I would like to dedicate this note to my father,
Matthew T. Oliverio, Esq. You are living proof that one father is more than a
hundred schoolmasters; all that I am, and all that I wish to be, is the result of
your tireless love and devotion. I would also like to thank my editors and
John Chung for their invaluable assistance throughout this process.
1. The Voluntary Restructuring of Solvent Insurers Act is contained in
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 27-14.5-1 to -6 (2008). A scheme of arrangement is a
method by which companies may reach binding agreements with creditors or
shareholders to restructure their financial obligations. See Susan Power
Johnston, Why U.S. Courts Should Deny or Severely Condition Recognition to
Schemes of Arrangement For Solvent Insurance Companies, 16 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 953, 953 (2007). A solvent scheme of arrangement is one
that may be utilized by a solvent company. Id. See also discussion infra pp.
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The Restructuring Act gives flexibility to a solvent restructuring
insurer or reinsurer to commute future liabilities in exchange for a
lump-sum payment to creditors. 2 In 2010 GTE Reinsurance (GTE
RE) became the first solvent reinsurer to test the constitutional
viability of the Act when it sought to enforce a commutation plan
in the Superior Court of Rhode Island.3 Despite the objections of
multiple reinsureds who found themselves in danger of receiving
insufficient funds to cover future liabilities, the Superior Court
sanctioned the commutation plan and determined that the scheme
of arrangement posed no constitutional problem.4 Yet, in doing so,
the court failed to appreciate a key feature of insurance: the
allocation of risk from the insured to insurer.5  This essential
feature of insurance distinguishes it from other contracts in which
risk is a mere ancillary characteristic. 6 While the decision is a
victory for solvent scheme proponents, it also reveals the potential
dangers these schemes pose to the contractual expectations of
insureds as well as the reliability of insurance products moving
forward-dangers that call into question whether such legislation
is truly in the best economic interests of a state.
The application of schemes of arrangement to insolvent
insurers wishing to restructure their debt obligations has been
recognized for decades, while some solvent insurers and
reinsurers have more recently sought to utilize these schemes as
well.7 However, a solvent insurer's or reinsurer's use of this debt-
4-7.
2. R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-14.5-4.
3. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 9
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). While this case involved a reinsurer and
reinsured-policyholders, for brevity, when not directly discussing GTE RE,
this note will discuss solvent schemes of arrangement by referring to all
policyholders (both reinsured and insured) by the general term "insured."
4. Id. at 40.
5. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 21 (3d ed.
2002) (noting that a key feature of insurance is "the transfer of risk from one
party to another").
6. See generally Steven J. Williams, Note, Distinguishing "Insurance"
From Investment Products Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Crafting a
Rule of Decision, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1996 (1998) (discussing how courts have
distinguished insurance products from other investment products by the role
that "risk" occupies in the contract); see also discussion infra Part III.
7. Howard Seife & Francisco Vazquez, U.S. Courts Should Continue to
Grant Recognition to Schemes of Arrangement of Solvent Insurance
Companies, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 571, 572 (2008).
SOLVENT SCHEMES
restructuring tactic has not been without protest. English
insurers and reinsurers have met considerable opposition from
U.S. creditors who oppose U.S. Bankruptcy law's recognition of
U.K. or Bermudian court-sanctioned commutation plans as foreign
proceedings. 8 Insureds are concerned about a solvent insurer's
ability to defeat their contractual expectations through a court-
sanctioned commutation plan that is approved by only a majority
of the company's creditors and abrogates a dissenting insured's
right of rejection.9 As such, there is a serious question as to
whether the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution
bans a state legislature from effectuating an ex post facto law that
extinguishes the contractual expectations of dissentient-insureds.
Rhode Island's Restructuring Act and the GTE Reinsurance
litigation have provided a United States jurisdiction the first
opportunity to address this question.
Unfortunately, the recent GTE Reinsurance analysis
prematurely dismissed the reallocation of risk from the insured to
its insurer as a non-essential characteristic of insurance.10 As
such, the court did not adequately address whether a solvent
scheme of arrangement substantially impairs insureds'
contractual rights under the Contract Clause." The court also
wrongly concluded that even if the reinsurance treaty at issue was
substantially impaired, economic growth was a sufficient public
purpose to justify the impairment.
This note will contextualize insureds' contractual expectations
within a modern economic system in which insurance contracts
act as vehicles for economic growth and security, and illustrate
8. Johnston, supra note 1, at 963 (discussing whether U.S. courts
should recognize solvent schemes of arrangement approved under section 425
of the Companies Act, 1985 as foreign proceedings under Chapter 15 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code to ensure the enforceability of a scheme against U.S.
policyholders).
9. Id. at 969 (stating that solvent schemes violate the policy of sanctity
of contract).
10. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at
15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011) (citation omitted) ("While the Court
acknowledges that the 'essence' of insurance is the transfer of risk, the Court
is of the opinion that at its most basic level, the risk involved is essentially
about the right to receive, and the obligation to make, a monetary payment
when a claim arises."); see also discussion infra Part II (discussing the Rhode
Island Superior Court's analysis).
11. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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how solvent schemes of arrangement can frustrate these
expectations. It will also explain how insureds' contractual
expectations are intimately related to the allocation of risk from
the insured to its insurer, and why the subsequent reallocation of
that risk back to the insured can substantially impair its
contractual expectations. To remedy this problem, this note will
present a new framework that balances the interests of the
commuting insurer with the contractual expectations of the
insured so as to prevent abuse of the statute at the hands of
substantially solvent companies. Such a framework will allow
courts more discretion than that currently allowed under Rhode
Island's Restructuring Act to ensure a company's debt-
restructuring practice adheres to the history and tradition of the
Contract Clause by maintaining insureds' contractual
expectations.12
Part I of this note is intended to give the reader the necessary
background with respect to the operation of solvent schemes of
arrangement, the utilization of commutation plans as debt
restructuring devices, and the corresponding indemnification
conundrum the plans can create for a company's insureds. Part II
discusses the Rhode Island Superior Court's decision in GTE
Reinsurance. Part III addresses the particular problems with the
court's reasoning and why it is important to recognize risk-
transfer as the principal object of insurance for a Contract Clause
analysis. Part IV examines how solvent schemes of arrangement
substantially impair the insured's contractual expectations by
12. "There is a wide disparity in the circumstances of companies that
enter run-off," which mandates close scrutiny of the company's situation and
how it relates to an insured's contractual expectations. See SPECIAL TASK
FORCE ON INSURANCE COMPANY RUN-OFF AND REORGANIZATION, OFFICE OF
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, FINAL REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE COMPANY RUN-OFF AND
REORGANIZATION, 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. Some, like GTE RE,
do not pose a of risk of becoming insolvent, thus negating many of the
benefits associated with solvent schemes of arrangement--certainty of
payment to creditors, avoiding deteriorating reinsurance collections, and
preventing unfairness amongst creditor collections-and creating the
contractual issues discussed in this piece. See Odyssey Insureds'
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Their Objections to GTE RE's
Petition to Approve the Commutation Plan Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-
14.5 and Insurance Regulation 68 at 9, In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB
10-3777 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Odyssey Insureds'
Supplemental Memorandum].
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abrogating the ostensible finality with which the contract has
transferred risk. Part V proposes an alternative analysis that
courts should utilize to condition solvent schemes of arrangement,
which protects the contractual expectations of the insured. Part
VI will address and dismiss the counterargument that the Rhode
Island General Assembly's intent to boost Rhode Island's economy
is sufficient to justify an impairment of an insurer or reinsurer's
contractual obligations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Operation of Schemes of Arrangement
Corporation law in Bermuda and the United Kingdom has
long provided companies the opportunity to discharge their debt
obligations through schemes of arrangement.1 3  Schemes of
arrangement are court-sanctioned compromises between a
company and one or more classes of creditors, or cedents.14 Under
English law, a company that proposes a scheme of arrangement
must petition the court for a meeting of its creditors and then
present a commutation plan.15  If seventy-five percent of the
creditors approve the plan, and the court sanctions the plan, the
debtor-company's obligations will be discharged with a lump-sum
payment made to its creditors. 16
Schemes have become popular within the past decade because
of the flexibility they provide to highly-leveraged corporations in
13. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895-901 (Eng.).
14. Adam Gallagher, The Growth of Schemes of Arrangement as the Tool
of Choice in Complex Restructurings, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2010, at 36, 36.
A "cedent" is defined as an organization that transfers risk to another
insurer, otherwise termed a "reinsured" or "ceding insurer." JOHN S.
DIAcONIs & DOUGLAS W. HAMMOND, REINSURANCE LAw § 1:1.2 (3d ed. 2008).
15. Gallagher, supra note 14, at 86; see also Companies Act, 2006, c. 46,
§ 899 (Eng.) (explaining the process under U.K. law by which a court
sanctions a scheme of arrangement). See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-
1(8) (2008) (defining "commutation plan" under Rhode Island's Voluntary
Restructuring of Solvent Insurers Act as "a plan for extinguishing the
outstanding liabilities of a commercial run-off insurer"); In re GTE
Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 3, n.5 (defining "Commutation"
as the 'valuation, settlement, and discharge of all obligations between
parties to a reinsurance contract. In return for cash, the primary insurer
withdraws the liability for outstanding losses and loss adjustment expenses
related to the commuted reinsurance contract."') (citation omitted).
16. Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 899 (Eng.).
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complex debt restructurings where creditors represent a variety of
interests.1 7  These schemes allow for multiple restructuring
options from simple covenant term amendments to full debt
releases.1 8  Additionally, a company is saved from the
"reputational stigma" of an insolvency proceeding.19  More
recently, insurance and reinsurance companies with large,
outstanding liabilities have utilized schemes of arrangement to
commute obligations under insurance and reinsurance treaties. 20
These companies are most notably run-off insurers and reinsurers
who have written large lines of business on occurrence-based
policies throughout the 1980s-90s.21
B. How Solvent Insurers and Reinsurers in Run-off Benefit from
Schemes of Arrangement
An insurance or reinsurance company enters into "run-off'
when it "ceases writing new business, but remains bound by its
preexisting contractual commitments under the policies and/or
reinsurance contracts into which it previously entered."22 So long
as the insurer or reinsurer remains solvent, it is obligated to pay
claims under its existing insurance or reinsurance contracts. 23
17. Gallagher, supra note 14, at 85-86 (explaining that a highly-
leveraged corporation is one with multiple tiers of debt and that a scheme of
arrangement is one option for a company forced to turn to debt-restructuring
options to deal with downturns in business performance).
18. Id. at 86.
19. Id.
20. Seife & Vazquez, supra note 7, at 572.
21. Occurrence-based policies provide coverage for "all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages . . . caused by an
occurrence" that takes place during the policy period. BARRY R. OSTRAGER &
THOMAS R. NEWMAN, 1 HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §
8.03[a], at489 (12th ed. 2004); In re Brit. Aviation Ins. Co., [2005] EWHC
(Ch), 1621, [2-3] (Eng.) (insurance company sought court approval of
commutation plan under U.K. Companies Act because it had written
insurance for American insureds on occurrence-based policies); In re Scottish
Lion Insurance Co., [2009] CSIH 6 1 (Scot.). For a definition of "run-off" see
discussion infra Part I.B.
22. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 3,
n.4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). "Reinsurance is a contractual arrangement
whereby a reinsurer, for consideration, agrees to indemnify a reinsured for all
or part of a loss that the reinsured may sustain under a policy or policies of
insurance issued by the reinsured to an original insured." DIAcONIS &
HAMMOND, supra note 14, §1:1.1.
23. Thomas F. Bush, Solvent Schemes Come to America, WILDMAN
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This means that an insurer or reinsurer may remain bound under
an occurrence-based policy for decades because coverage is
triggered when an insured risk occurs during the policy period,
even if the claim does not manifest itself until decades later. 24
This risk results in long-tail liability because such a claim is
separated by multiple years from the circumstances that caused it
during the policy period.25  Occurrence-based policies most
commonly insure against long-tail liability such as products
liability, asbestos-related injuries, chemical exposure, and
environmental pollution. 26  Where this type of liability exists,
there may not be a final settlement of a claim until many years
after the policy period has lapsed.27
As a result, occurrence-based policies may take a run-off
insurer decades to administer, and tie up significant amounts of
capital. 28 A marginally solvent run-off insurer may later become
insolvent should it continue in run-off.29 Alternatively, an insurer
can expedite the exhaustive run-off process by providing early
payouts to creditors-based on actuarial estimates-in exchange
for the cancellation of future obligations under a solvent scheme of
arrangement, which is more attractive than continuing in run-
off. 30
HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP (June 2011), http://64.78.35.30/article/Solvent
SchemesCome_to_America_June2011_header.pdf.
24. Johnston, supra note 1, at 954. See also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,
supra note 21, at 489 ("The distinguishing feature of an occurrence policy is
that it results in so-called 'tail' coverage, which refers to the lapse of time
between the occurrence and the date a claim is made.").
25. The term "long-tail" refers to "tail" coverage over multiple years. See
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 21, at 489.
26. Johnston, supra note 1, at 954. Nowadays, most commercial general
liability policies include an asbestos exclusion. Kevin M. Madigan & Claus S.
Metzner, Reserving for Asbestos Liabilities, 188-91 http://www.casact.org/
pubs/forum/03fforum/03ff173.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
27. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 954.
28. Stephen M. Prignano & Matthew Murphy, Rhode Island Court
Approves Nation's First Solvent Scheme Program, EDWARDS WILDMAN
NEWSSTAND (Sept, 2011), http://www.edwardswildman.com/newsstand/
detail.aspx?news=2503.
29. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 6 (discussing the greater need
for regulatory oversight of marginally solvent companies who have a higher
potential for insolvency if a run-off proceeding is not successful).
30. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 955.
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C. Rhode Island's Voluntary Restructuring of Solvent Insurers
and Reinsurers Act
In 1995, then Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond
recognized the insurance industry's potential for stimulating the
state's economic growth and created the Governor's Insurance
Development Task Force to "develop a legislative and regulatory
agenda to establish Rhode Island as a highly competitive state in
which to domicile companies in one or more segments of the
insurance industry."31  The Task Force was first assigned to
identify legal and regulatory barriers in Rhode Island that
affected the insurance industry.32 The Task Force was instructed
to "[d]evelop specific legislation, in consultation with industry
experts, regulators, leadership in the General Assembly and
economic developers" so as to "position Rhode Island as the most
competitive United States location for one or more target
segments of the insurance industry."33
In 2002, the Rhode Island State Legislature, upon the
recommendations of the Governor's Task Force, enacted the
Restructuring Act. 34 The Restructuring Act entitles a commercial
run-off insurer, or reinsurer, that is domiciled in Rhode Island, or
that has re-domiciled for purposes of the Restructuring Act, to
petition the Superior Court to implement a commutation plan that
has been approved by the Department of Business Regulation
(DBR).35
31. R.I. Exec. Order No. 95-21, § I (Aug. 22, 1995), available at
http://www.library.state.ri.us/publications/governor/executiveorders/1995/95e
xec2l.pdf.
32. Id. § III(C).
33. Id. § III(D).
34. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 2
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). The Restructuring Act is contained in R.I.
Gen. Laws § 27-14.5-1 to -6.
35. A "Commercial run-off insurer" is defined as
(i) A run-off insurer domiciled in Rhode Island whose business,
excluding all business subject to an assumption reinsurance
agreement, includes only the reinsuring of any line(s) of business
other than life and/or the insuring of any line(s) of business other
than life, workers' compensation, and personal lines insurance; or
(ii) A Rhode Island domestic insurance company meeting the
requirements of subsection (i) hereof and formed or re-activated for
the sole purpose of entering into a voluntary restructuring under
this chapter and whose liabilities consist of commercial liabilities
2012] SOLVENT SCHEMES 447
DBR regulation 68 dictates the process by which a solvent
insurer or reinsurer can present a commutation plan.36  An
applicant must first submit a plan to the DBR for review. 37 The
DBR has sixty days to review the plan, make comments, and send
it back to the applicant. 38 After the DBR is satisfied with the
make-up of the proposed class of creditors and approves the
commutation plan, the applicant must apply to the Superior Court
of Rhode Island for a court order calling a "Meeting of
Creditors."39 At the "Meeting of Creditors," the applicant submits
the commutation plan to a vote.40 If the applicant receives the
transferred to said company with the approval of the [DBR] and
pursuant to the regulations issued by the [DBR] under this chapter.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-1(6) (2008). A "Run-off insurer" is "an insurer that:
(i) Is domiciled in Rhode Island; (ii) Has liabilities under policies for property
and casualty lines of business; (iii) Has ceased underwriting new business;
and (iv) Is only renewing ongoing business to the extent required by law or by
contract." Id. § 27-14.5-1(21). The Rhode Island Department of Business
Regulation describes its primary function as "the implementation of state
laws mandating the regulation and licensing of designated businesses,
professions, occupations and other specified activities." About The
Department of Business Regulation, R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REG.,
http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/about/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
36. See In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 3, n.6;
see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14-17 (2007) (giving the director of the DBR the
power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out its duties
assigned by law); id. § 42-14-1 to -19 (enumerating the various powers of the
DBR including that over the Rhode Island insurance industry). "Reg. 68 was
issued in accordance with [sections 27-14.5-6 and 42-14-17] which empower
DBR's commissioner to 'promulgate rules and regulations that may be
necessary to effectuate [the Restructuring Act's purpose]."' In re GTE
Reinsurance, No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 3, n.6.
37.. See 11-5 R.I. CODER. § 68:4(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2010).
38. Id. § 4(a)(ii).
39. Id. § 4(iii). Rhode Island General Laws section 27-14.5-2 grants
jurisdiction over the sanctioning of commutation plans to the Rhode Island
Superior Court. The notion that, in some instances, creditors must be divided
into separate classes for purposes of a scheme of arrangement is borrowed
from the U.K. Companies Act. Companies Act, 1985, c. 41, § 425 (Eng.). A
properly composed "creditor class" consists of individual creditors who have a
sufficient commonality of rights so that they may collectively determine what
is in their best interest. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 958. Under Rhode
Island law, a "Class of creditors" is defined to mean "(i) All voting
policyholders, including those without known claims; (ii) Voting creditors,
other than policyholders; or (iii) Any separate class of creditors as the court
may in its discretion determine should approve the commutation plan." R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-1(5).
40. 11-5 R.I. CODE R. § 4(c).
448 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:439
consent of fifty percent of each class of creditors, and seventy-five
percent of the value of liabilities owed to each class of creditors,
the applicant can petition the court to implement the
commutation plan.41 "[Votes [are] calculated according to the
aggregate amount of claims specified against the Applicant in
respect of insurance or reinsurance contracts detailed in the
voting form" to determine whether the requisite statutory
majority has been obtained.42 If the requisite majority of votes is
obtained and the court determines the plan does not "materially
adversely affect either the interests of objecting creditors or the
interests of assumption policyholders" it will enter an
implementation order. 43
The court's implementation order has several effects. It
effectuates the commutation plan by enjoining all litigation in all
jurisdictions between the applicant and creditors and requires the
creditors to submit all claims information by the date specified in
the order (the "bar date"), after which no further liabilities will be
paid.4 Additionally, it releases the applicant from all obligations
to its creditors and policyholders upon payment of the amount
specified in the plan, and requires the applicant to provide a
quarterly report to both the commissioner and the court that
details the progress of the plan's implementation. 45  It further
binds the applicant and all creditors and policyholders, including
dissentients. 46  The dissenting insured's inability to present
claims after the bar date-particularly if it has large outstanding
long-tail liabilities-raises questions as to whether an insurer
should be permitted, under the Restructuring Act, to abrogate a
dissenting insured's contract.
41. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.5-4.
42. 11-5 R.I. CODE R. § 4(c).
43. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.5-4. An "assumption reinsurance" agreement
is one in which the ceding insurer cedes, and the assuming insurer assumes
all of the policyholder liabilities. The assuming insurer therefore becomes
directly liable to the policyholder, now called the assumption policyholder.
See Cindy Chang, A 50-State Look at Assumption Reinsurance: The Road to
Novation, MORRIS, MANNING & MARTIN, LLP (June 1, 2009),
http://www.mmmlaw.com/media-room/publications/newsletter/a- 50-state-
look-at-assumption-reinsurance-the-road-to-novation.
44. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.5-4.
45. Id.
46. Id.
SOLVENT SCHEMES
D. The Notion of Substantial Impairment and the Contract
Clause
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution reads,
"no State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . . "47 Though not the subject of heavy debate, the
Clause's pre-ratification history demonstrates that its primary
purpose was to protect private parties' interests and expectations,
particularly given that fluctuating public policies often drive
legislation. 48 James Madison's Federalist Paper 44 perhaps best
illuminates the intention of the Framers:
Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this
constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and
private rights; and I am much deceived if they have not,
in so doing as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments
as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The
sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating
policy which has directed the public councils. They have
seen with regret and indignation, that sudden changes
and legislative inferences, in cases affecting personal
rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and
influential speculators, and snares to the more
industrious and less informed part of the community.
They have seen, too, that one legislative interference, is
but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every
subsequent interference being naturally produced by the
effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer,
therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting which
will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a
general prudence and industry, and give a regular course
to the business of society. 49
Early Supreme Court decisions echo Madison's sentiments.
47. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. see also R.I. CONsT. art. I, § 12. ("No ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be passed.").
48. See Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature, and
Unfair Surprise: Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause,
92 MICH. L. REV. 398, 399 (discussing how the Supreme Court's early
Contract Clause decisions highlight the clause's original purpose).
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_44.html.
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Chief Justice Marshall recognized that state legislative
enactments that impair contracts have the effect of "break[ing] in
upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy[ing] all
confidence between man and man."50  In Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, the Court held the Contract Clause stands for "the
necessity and policy of giving permanence and security to
contracts, [and] of withdrawing them from the influence of
legislative bodies, whose fluctuating policy, and repeated
interferences, produced the most perplexing and injurious
embarrassments. . .. "s1
Yet, the strictures imposed by the language of the Clause
have never been strictly interpreted, and the Court has carved out
a narrow exception for matters affecting the public welfare,
particularly where exigent circumstances exist that compel the
legislation.5 2 In Stone v. Mississippi, the Court recognized a state
legislature's right to exercise its police power notwithstanding the
Contract Clause. 53 There, Mississippi had granted a twenty-five-
year charter for the operation of a lottery, but later revoked the
charter after the state legislature passed a new constitution
forbidding the lottery. 54  Although the Stone Court limited the
legislature's imposition on the Contract Clause to matters
affecting "the preservation of the public health and the public
morals,"55 years later it defined the scope of this abrogation power
in terms of emergency circumstances in Blaisdell.56 There, the
Court upheld a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law that was
passed to relieve certain effects of the depression. 57 While slightly
liberalizing Contract Clause jurisprudence, the Court's decisions
were not intended to give state legislatures carte blanche to
50. Graham, supra note 48, at 404 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
51. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 648 (1819); see also Graham, supra note 48,
at 404-405.
52. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934);
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
53. Stone, 101 U.S. at 820 (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College,17 U.S.
at 629) ("'[T]he framers of the Constitution did not intend [the Contract
Clause] to restrain States in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted
for internal government .....
54. Id. at 817.
55. Id. at 820.
56. 290 U.S. at 423.
57. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 423.
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impair contractual obligations.58  In fact, the decision required
that any ex post facto law impairing contractual obligations be
narrowly tailored; it could remedy only the emergency and could
not outlast the exigency. 59
Contract Clause analysis since Blaisdell asks whether a law
substantially impairs a party's obligations, and if so, whether the
law is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose. 60  However, what constitutes an important public
purpose is ill defined, and the Court's earlier decisions remain
relevant. 61  Contractual expectations, and the nature of the
exigency that requires the impairment, should be considered as
the guideposts of modern Contract Clause jurisprudence.
II. IN RE GTE REINSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
GTE RE was incorporated in Bermuda in 1976 "as a captive
insurer and reinsurer of GTE Corporation." 62 On June 24, 2010,
GTE RE redomiciled in Rhode Island and later filed a
commutation plan with the DBR.63 Under the plan, GTE RE
proposed to make lump-sum payments to each of its creditors and
policyholders with whom it had entered into reinsurance treaties
between 1980 and 1986.64 In exchange, these lump-sum
58. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 423-448.
59. Id. at 441-443 ("[A] law depending upon the existence of an
emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if
the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.")
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)
(noting that the question as to whether there is a substantial impairment of a
contract has three components: "whether there is a contractual relationship,
whether a change in the law impairs that contractual relationship, and
whether the impairment is substantial").
61. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978)
(warning that "[i]f the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all . . . it
must be understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to
abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its
otherwise legitimate police power").
62. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 7
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). A captive insurance company is one
established with the specific purpose of financing the risks of its parent
corporation. A secondary purpose is to insure the risks of the parent
corporation's customers.
63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Id. Reinsurance contracts are known as "treaties." The reinsurance
treaty at issue involved one executed by a predecessor of GTE RE that was
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payments would relieve GTE RE of all future liabilities remaining
under the treaties, including any incurred-but unreported losses
(IBNR liability).65 The DBR reviewed the commutation plan and
submitted a series of questions and comments to GTE RE that
were subsequently incorporated into a final Commutation Plan.66
The final Plan provided that "[a]s a result of the Commutation
Plan, the Company's liability to ... Creditors in respect of Claims
will cease and subsequent losses, which otherwise might have
resulted in a claim against the Company in the ordinary course,
will not be covered."67
The DBR approved the Commutation Plan on June 25,
2010.68 GTE RE then filed a petition with the Superior Court of
Rhode Island to implement the Commutation Plan.69
On July 21, 2010, the Superior Court determined that a single
class of creditors was appropriate and granted GTE RE's motion
to convene a Meeting of the Creditors. 70 At the meeting, GTE RE
received consent from thirty-four of thirty-nine cedents,
representing roughly ninety-seven percent of the value of the
liabilities owed to the voting members of the creditor class.n7 Five
cedents objected. One-Hudson-objected on the grounds that
GTE RE had undervalued its claims by $300,000.72 Despite
eventually ceded to GTE RE. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3-4. The treaty was a continuous quota
share reinsurance contract. Id. "Quota share reinsurance is '[a] form of pro
rata reinsurance (proportional) in which the reinsurer assumes an agreed
percentage of each insurance being insured and shares all premiums and
losses accordingly with the reinsured."' Id. at 3 (citation omitted). The
reinsurance treaty at issue here was executed with the Hudson Insurance
Company on September 15, 1981 and was effective through December 31,
1985. Id. The treaty states that GTE RE was liable for all losses occurring
prior to the termination date. Id.
65. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5-
6. "IBNR" is short-form in insurance for "incurred-but unreported losses."
See Bush, supra note 23, at 1. This phrase refers to liability that remains on
the policy at issue (even after the termination date has lapsed) for claims that
are either unsettled or not reported for the policy period at issue. See id.
66. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 9.
67. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
68. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 9.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing
creditor classes).
71. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 10.
72. Id. Hudson alleged the value of its total claims was in excess of
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Hudson's objections, GTE RE filed its motion to implement the
Commutation Plan on December 2, 2010.73 On December 14th,
2010, Hudson filed its objections in the Superior Court of Rhode
Island, challenging the constitutionality of the Restructuring
Act. 74
Hudson alleged that Rhode Island's Restructuring Act, as
applied, violated the Contract and Due Process Clauses of the
Rhode Island and U.S. Constitutions because its future
indemnification rights, under its reinsurance treaty, were
substantially impaired.7 5  Hudson asserted that the lump-sum
payout might provide it with less in indemnification payments
than if GTE RE remained in run-off.76  Hudson believed the
actuarial estimate utilized by GTE RE was tenuous because much
of its business-reinsured by the GTE RE treaty-had been
written on occurrence-based policies still subject to long-tail IBNR
$1,300,000. Id. See also supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing
the Hudson policy). Hudson is an affiliate of Odyssey America Reinsurance
Corporation. In earlier memoranda filed by the parties with the court,
Hudson is referred to as the "Odyssey Insureds" because Hudson, along with
Clearwater-another Odyssey affiliate-were both parties to the lawsuit.
The Superior Court's amended decision filed in February 2012, however, lists
Hudson as the only objecting party.
73. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 10.
74. Id. at 10. During the period that Hudson was covered by the GTE
RE reinsurance treaty, Hudson had, itself, issued policies covering IBNR
claims that often take decades to fully emerge or develop as is the case with
toxic-torts, asbestos exposure, and environmental torts. Odyssey Insureds'
Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4-5.
75. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 11-15.
While this article is limited to addressing the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution, the Rhode Island Constitution contains a nearly
identical provision, which states that "[n]o ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligation of contracts, shall be passed." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1;
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 12.
76. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 16.
Hudson's objection was premised upon the language found in the Hudson
contract stating that "[t]he Reinsurer's liability for risks ceded shall continue
until the final settlement of all losses which have occurred during the
Underwriting Year." Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra
note 12, at 7 (emphasis added). Because there was the potential that Hudson
would receive an insufficient sum under the Commutation Plan to cover its
own liabilities for the risks it insured on occurrence-based policies that
covered IBNR claims, Hudson argued that the GTE RE Commutation Plan
negated the very essence of its reinsurance treaty and that such an
impairment constituted a substantial impairment under the Contract Clause.
Id. at 6-7.
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liability. 7
Despite the inherent problem associated with the valuation of
the Commutation Plan, the Rhode Island Superior Court upheld
the validity of the Restructuring Act. 78 The judge held there was
no substantial impairment, noting:
While the Court acknowledges that the "essence" of
insurance is the transfer of risk, the Court is of the
opinion that at its most basic level, the risk involved is
essentially about the right to receive, and the obligation to
make, a monetary payment when a claim arises.... Put
simply, Hudson contracted for the payment of money, and
under the Commutation Plan, that is exactly the benefit it
will receive.79
The court also noted that even if there was a substantial
impairment, Rhode Island's economic interests would have
justified the Restructuring Act because it allowed the General
Assembly to "address economic issues endemic to the insurance
industry and Rhode Island as a whole."80  Yet, the court's
77. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 12.
Addressing the nature of its IBNR claims, Hudson wrote:
IBNR is an imprecise estimate of the unknown-a snapshot of a
moment in time that must be adjusted on an ongoing basis based
upon developing information. No matter how skillfully estimated,
IBNR cannot, to quote Former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, accurately estimate the 'unknown unknowns.' If some
new 'unknown' appears-a new wave of environmental or mass tort
claims, for example-the exposure could be enormous. History
teaches that they do arise, with catastrophic consequences.
Asbestos, environmental claims, mold, lead, latex, terrorism, and
cyber liability are all recent examples. It is indisputable that
whatever estimate either party makes now will, once all of the
current and future claims have been paid, be wrong. Accordingly, to
compare the proposed commutation payment against another
actuarial estimate cannot adequately measure the impairment of the
Odyssey Insureds' contractual rights to indemnification.
Id.
78. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 40. Judge
Silverstein also dismissed Hudson's Due Process claim. Id.
79. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 34. The court's reference to "economic issues endemic to the
insurance industry" most likely pertains to issues associated with solvent
companies in run-off such as the expense to the company, inequitable
distribution of funds among claimants, and increased burdens on other
companies that insured's elect to seek coverage from rather than the run-off
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simplistic reasoning failed to consider insurance's function as a
means of economic security-independent of the actual payment of
money-that is achieved by the allocation of risk from the insured
to the insurer.8 1
This note has discussed the operation of solvent schemes of
arrangement and the factual circumstances giving rise to GTE
Reinsurance. The next section will explain why the Rhode Island
Superior Court's analysis sets a dangerous precedent insofar as its
decision fails to recognize that the transfer of risk-from the
insured to the insurer-is the essential element of an insurance
contract.
III. RISK-TRANSFER Is THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT.
The GTE Reinsurance court's definition of insurance is
inaccurate insofar as it misclassifies the risk-element of insurance
contracts. Judge Silverstein classified the risk element of the
GTE RE reinsurance treaty as that involved with Hudson's right
to receive, and GTE RE's obligation to make, a monetary payment,
rather than the risk that Hudson transferred to GTE RE under
the treaty. 82 But the court cited no case law and proffered only
two secondary sources to support its theory.83  Moreover, it is
believed that
The articulation of a generally applicable definition of
insurance has proven to be a very difficult task. The
crafting of a definition of insurance that is both precise
enough to be of use in distinguishing among various
transactions and broad enough to be viewed as generally
company. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-4. This note, however,
presents the argument that due to the disparity of circumstances of
companies that enter into run-off, solvent schemes can be more harmful to
some creditors. See discussion infra Part V.
81. See discussion infra Part III.
82. See In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 15.
83. The court cited to Couch on Insurance, which defines insurance as
[A] contract by which one party (the insurer), for consideration that
usually is paid in money, either in a lump sum or at different times
during the continuance of the risk, promises to make a certain
payment, usually of money, upon the destruction or injury of
"something" in which the other party (the insured) has an interest.
1 STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 1:6 (2009).
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applicable has been an elusive goal ... 84
Even the treatise cited by the court provides six alternative
definitions of insurance, none of which the court expressly
acknowledged.ss In fact, "[i]nsurance has been defined in
numerous ways" and a number of its definitions recognize the
essential characteristics of risk transfer and distribution. 86
A. Defining Insurance By Risk
Definitions recognizing insurance's risk-transfer function
describe insurance as "a contractual security against anticipated
loss where the risk of loss is occasioned by some future or
contingent event and is shifted to or assumed by the insurer, with
a distribution of the risk of loss by the payment of a premium or
other assessment into a general fund[," 87  or as "a contract
whereby one party promises for a consideration to indemnify the
other against certain risks."8 8  It is also believed that "[t]he
primary requisite essential to a contract of insurance is the
assumption of a risk of loss and the undertaking to indemnify the
insured against such loss. . . ."89 In fact, "[t]he element of risk is a
prominent part of the definition of insurance given by many
courts . . . ." 90
Other treatises adopt definitions similar to those that
highlight insurance's risk-transfer function.91 For example,
Appleman states, "[a]t its core essence, risk is the Mother Mold of
Insurance .... In a superficial way, insurance is generally
understood as risk sharing through consensual arrangements
which transfer and distribute risks among the consenting
84. Williams, supra note 6, at 2013 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
85. See PLITT, supra note 83, § 1:6 (footnote omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. PLITT, supra note 83, at § 1:9.
90. Id.
91. See 1 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 1.2 (2d ed. 1996). See also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW §§ 1.2, 1.3 (1988) (observing that insurance is an
arrangement for transferring and distributing risk: at the very heart of
insurance is this transfer and distribution of risk).
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parties."92 While one can argue that the GTE Reinsurance court
did discuss risk as an element of insurance contracts, the risk the
court discussed in its opinion differs from that referred to in the
above-mentioned definitions.
The Rhode Island Superior Court actually defined the risk
element of the GTE RE reinsurance treaty as the risk that the
insured or reinsured may not actually receive the indemnification
amount. 93 However, "[t]o some extent, every contract involves the
manipulation of risk. . . . [A] contract to sell property transfers
from the seller to buyer the risk that a catastrophe will render the
property worthless."94 The difference between the risk involved
with a property-sale contract and the risk that is the object of an
insurance contract is that the risk associated with the former is
not the purpose of the contract-it is only a function of it.95
Insurance's principal object, on the other hand, is the transfer of
risk for the benefits that the freedom of risk entails.96 Therefore,
because the purpose of insurance is not to transfer a monetary
sum, but instead to transfer risk, it cannot be true that the risk
involved in an insurance contract is solely about the obligation to
make, and right to receive, a monetary sum. Rather, the GTE
Reinsurance court misclassified the risk element of the GTE RE
reinsurance treaty.97 Jordan v. Group Health Association98 and
Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,99 discussed in the next
section, further illuminate this point.
92. HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 91, § 1.2.
93. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 17-
18 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011) (defining the risk as "the right to receive,
and the obligation to make, a monetary payment when a claim arises").
94. Williams, supra note 6, at 2018.
95. See JERRY, supra note 5, at 19 (distinguishing insurance from other
contracts that similarly allocate risk).
96. See Jordan v. Grp. Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(establishing the "principal object" test for determining insurance); see also
JERRY, supra note 5, at 17-19 (discussing the economic effects associated with
the transfer and distribution of risk); discussion infra Part III.B.
97. See In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 15-16.
98. 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
99. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
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B. The GTE Reinsurance Court Missed the Essential Purpose of
Insurance.
Jordan established the "principal object" test for
distinguishing insurance contracts from other contracts having
characteristics of insurance that are ancillary to their principal
purpose.' 00 Jordan addressed whether a state insurance statute
applied to group health plans that provided medical services on an
"as needed" basis in exchange for the payment of a monthly fee.101
The D.C. Circuit Court noted:
That an incidental element of risk distribution or
assumption may be present should not outweigh all other
factors. If attention is focused only on that feature, the
line between insurance or indemnity and other types of
legal arrangement and economic function becomes faint,
if not extinct. This is especially true when the contract is
for the sale of goods or services on contingency. But
obviously it was not the purpose of the insurance statutes
to regulate all arrangements for assumption or
distribution of risk. That view would cause them to
engulf practically all contracts, particularly conditional
sales and contingent service agreements. The fallacy is in
looking only at the risk element, to the exclusion of all
others present or their subordination to it. The question
turns, not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on
whether that or something else to which it is related in
the particular plan is its principal object and purpose. 102
The "principal object" test points out that a warranty
accompanying the purchase of a good has features of insurance
but is ancillary to the principal purpose of the contract: the
purchased good.103  So too, the risk element that the GTE
Reinsurance court addressed-the risk that an insured or
reinsured may or may not receive an indemnification payment
under an insurance contract-is not the principal purpose of the
GTE RE reinsurance treaty; it is a function of the actual risk that
100. 107 F.2d at 248. Because Jordan is a D.C. Circuit court opinion it is
not binding precedent on Rhode Island.
101. See id. at 240-44.
102. Id. at 247-48.
103. See JERRY, supra note 5, at 27.
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Hudson transferred which is, itself, the principal object of the
reinsurance treaty. 104
The United States Supreme Court also focused on risk-
transfer in Pireno when it established a three-part test to
distinguish "the business of insurance" from other business for
purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.105 Under this approach
a court must look at whether the practice (1) "has the effect of
transferring and spreading the policyholder's risk;" (2) "is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured;" and (3) "is limited to entities within the insurance
industry." 0 6
The Pireno test is enlightening because it further illustrates
that Hudson's principal purpose for obtaining the reinsurance
treaty was to transfer its risk to GTE RE.10 7 The Supreme Court
defined the "business of insurance" in Pireno as involving a
practice that transfers and distributes risk. 0 8 The Court noted,
"one indispensable characteristic of insurance is the spreading
and underwriting of a policyholder's risk .... Congress
understood the business of insurance to be the underwriting and
spreading of risk."' 09 GTE RE's ability to spread Hudson's risk
among other similarly situated parties in exchange for a premium
is exactly what gave the reinsurance treaty its distinctive
character, and it explains why Hudson entered into the treaty in
the first place."10
104. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 17-
18 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011).
105. 458 U.S. 49, 129 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). There,
the New York State Chiropractic Association ("NYSCA") aided an insurance
company in evaluating claims for chiropractic treatments. Id. at 123. Pireno
alleged the collaborative effort violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Id.
at124. The District Court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the
insurance company's use of the NYSCA peer review committee was exempted
from antitrust scrutiny by the McCarran Ferguson Act that applies to the
"business of insurance." Id. On certiorari, the Supreme Court set forth a
three-part test to determine whether a particular practice is part of the
"business of insurance." Id. at 129.
106. Id. at 129.
107. See JERRY, supra note 5, at 27.
108. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 130.
109. Id. at 127 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See GAF Corp. v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 629 F.2d 981, 984 (4th Cir. 1980)
(noting the elements of risk transfer and distribution give insurance
transactions their "distinctive character"); Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental
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Pireno and the "principal object" test of Jordan point out that
the insured's ability to transfer risk is the defining characteristic
of an insurance contract.111 The Rhode Island Superior Court,
however, dismissed this precedent and conflated a function of
Hudson's risk allocation with the actual risk transferred. 112 By
defining the risk element of the reinsurance treaty as it did,
however, the court was able to dismiss the Contract Clause
question without addressing the problematic issue of the
contingent IBNR liabilities that were transferred to GTE RE
under the Hudson Treaty. Recall that the court noted that "the
risk involved is essentially about the right to receive, and the
obligation to make, a monetary payment when a claim arises. . . .
Put simply, Hudson contracted for the payment of money, and
under the Commutation Plan, that is exactly the benefit it will
receive." 1 13 The risk associated with Hudson's IBNR liabilities has
been cursorily dismissed without explanation.
Insurance has been defined as "a contractual security against
anticipated loss where the risk of loss is occasioned by some future
or contingent event and is shifted to or assumed by the
insurer... ."114 The next section of this note will address why,
had the court followed Pireno and Jordan, it would have found
that there was a substantial impairment of the GTE RE
reinsurance treaty in light of the risk-transfer function of
insurance.1 1 5
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6-7 (arguing that when Hudson specifically
contracted to shift its risk of loss to GTE, "'[tlhe Reinsurer's liability for risks
ceded shall continue until the final settlement of all losses which have
occurred during the Underwriting Year').
111. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 127; Jordan v. Grp. Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d
239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939); see also discussion supra Part III.A.
112. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op at
15-16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011) ("While the Court acknowledges that the
'essence' of insurance is the transfer of risk, the Court is of the opinion that at
its most basic level, the risk involved is essentially about the right to receive,
and the obligation to make, a monetary payment when a claim arises....
Indeed, the risk assumed by GTE RE under the Hudson Treaty is the
responsibility to reimburse Hudson for, or indemnify it against, covered
claims and legal fees incurred in defending those claims, up to the Treaty's
monetary cap.").
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. PLITT, supra note 83, at § 1:9.
115. See also infra Part IV (discussing how solvent schemes of
arrangement substantially impair an insured's expectations by abrogating its
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C. The Benefits Associated with the Transfer of Risk
Insurance affects every individual on a daily basis because life
involves risk that, if not handled properly, can result in
unexpected losses. In fact, "[t]he creation and enforcement of
insurance contracts .. . vitally affect the social and economic
welfare of individuals."1 1 6 The United States Supreme Court has
even declared that insurance is a business in the public
interest.1 17  This is because most human activities involve risk
that can have different effects: economic, social, political,
psychological, physical or legal.118  "An individual's attitude
toward" a particular activity is influenced by factors such as the
"probability of loss, the potential magnitude of the loss, and the
person's ability to absorb the loss."ll 9 As the potential magnitude
or probability of loss increases, an entity becomes more risk
averse. 120 Accordingly, society has developed methods of risk-
management that distribute risk among multiple parties, a
practice dating back as early as 2250 B.C.E.121 One such method
of risk-management is insurance.
Insurance is particularly important in an economically
advanced society because pure risk breeds uncertainty.122
Williams and Heins argue that uncertainty has two costs
associated with it. First, it tends to reduce the total satisfaction
associated with a given economic status. 123  Second, it has the
ability to transfer risk).
116. JERRY, supra note 5, at 1 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
117. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1914).
118. WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 11.
119. JERRY, supra note 5, at 15.
120. Id. at 16. See also WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 11.
121. The earliest occurrences of risk-distribution mechanisms likely
formed as a result of the maritime practices of the ancient traders of the
Mediterranean. See JERRY, supra note 5, at 20-21. Perhaps the most famous
iteration of the insurance industry began around 1688 when "Lloyd's Coffee
House," a small public house for private English merchants, began
indemnifying other merchants for losses suffered at sea and developed
modern insurance. Id. at 22-23. "Lloyd's Coffee House" is now better known
as Lloyd's of London. Id. at 23.
122. See WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 13 (defining pure risk as
risk in which loss is the only possible outcome and that insurance is the
product purchased to mitigate pure risk).
123. Id. at 17.
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proclivity "to cause inefficiencies in the utilization of existing
capital" that, in turn, inhibit "the development of new capital."l24
As such, the uncertainty that originates from the abrogation of an
insurer or reinsurer's indemnification obligation can inhibit the
development of new capital. 125 As a result, investors would be
hesitant to invest capital in new businesses.126  This slows
investment of capital into a business, retarding the production of a
new business, and translates into the loss of potentially beneficial
endeavors to society.127  Insurance, however, allows a party to
manage "pure" risk by shifting it to an insurer who has the ability
to distribute the risk amongst similarly situated parties for the
payment of a premium. 128 The insurer's obligation to accept and
spread the insured's risk provides the insured with security
against unexpected losses. In turn, an insured can assume
speculative risks that it might otherwise avoid. 129
The economic benefits insurance provides are many. For
example, a business may increase profits through the innovation
of new products without the fear of exposure to consumer suits. 130
Profits from new products flow into the marketplace, encouraging
the accumulation of new capital. 131 Furthermore, other
businesses, creditors, and consumers are more likely to do
business with a company protected by insurance than one that is
not. 132  These benefits exist, regardless of an actual
124. Id. at 17-19. Williams and Heins also note that while uncertainty
can be costly, it also provides opportunities for improvement of economic
positions. Id. at 19. This is not the case, however, with pure risk, which "is
universally agreed to be costly." Id. at 19.
125. See id. at 18-19.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. 18-19. See also Williams, supra note 6, at 2014-15.
128. See WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 196.
129. WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 27. See also Williams, supra
note 6, at 2014 (explaining how the insurer reduces uncertainty by combining
similar risks together in numbers large enough that the actual losses of the
entire group fall within statistical norms and replacing a large unknown risk
with a small certain cost-the premium).
130. WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 27.
131. Williams, supra note 6, at 2014-15 (discussing that insurance, as a
form of security, provides efficiency gains by reducing the amount of reserves
of capital that a company must hold in the absence of insurance and that this
allows that capital to be more profitably invested in other areas encouraging
new investments and the accumulation of new capital).
132. WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 27.
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indemnification payment, because the insured's expectation of
economic security exists at the moment the insurer agrees to
accept the insured's risk.133 Similarly, at the moment Hudson
entered into its reinsurance treaty with GTE RE, it had these
same expectations.
D. The Difference Between Economic Security and the
Indemnification Payment
One may argue that Hudson's expectation of economic
security was adequately protected by the lump-sum payment
provided by the Commutation Plan, even if the risk originally
transferred to GTE RE was reallocated back to Hudson. True, the
actual payment of money upon a contingent event (the
"indemnification payment" represented by the lump-sum
Commutation Plan payment) is the most recognizable benefit of
insurance, but the indemnification obligation of the insurer is part
and parcel of the essential purpose of insurance: security. 134
Security is the benefit that exists immediately upon the
procurement of the contract, and independent of an actual
indemnification payment.135 This is because the indemnification
obligation can be broader than the indemnification payment.
Recall that Hudson transferred its liability for contingent
IBNR claims to GTE RE under a reinsurance treaty that provided
coverage for "all losses" that occurred during the coverage
period.136 Had GTE RE chosen to remain in run-off, it would have
remained obligated to indemnify Hudson for all claims that
occurred during the coverage period. 137 As a result of the
133. See Williams, supra note 6, at 2014 ("Even if no loss occurs, the
insured enjoys the benefits of security. Thus, if one considers only the
individual policyholder, risk shifting is the central element of insurance.").
134. See PLITT, supra note 83, § 1:6 (defining insurance as contractual
security against the risk of loss); discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the
economic benefits attributed to the risk-transfer provided by insurance).
135. This is evidenced by the insured's ability to assume speculative risks
it may not otherwise assume, even before an insurer makes an
indemnification payment. This is because the insured is not forced to set
aside large reserves of capital for its own economic security. See supra notes
130, 132 and accompanying text.
136. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
137. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd. , C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at
3, n.4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011) (explaining that a run-off insurer or
reinsurer remains bound by its pre-existing contractual obligations).
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Commutation Plan, however, "[Hudson's] subsequent losses which
otherwise might have resulted in a claim against [GTE RE] in the
ordinary course, will not be covered" resulting in a risk that
Hudson may ultimately receive less than it would have received if
the reinsurance treaty had not been commuted. 138  Hudson's
expectation of economic security was therefore greater under the
reinsurance treaty than under the Commutation Plan given the
greater breadth of coverage provided by GTE RE's original
indemnification obligation.139
The breadth of the indemnification obligation compared with
that of the indemnification payment is illustrated in In re Texas
Association of School Boards, Inc.140 There, the Texas Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the notion that an insurer's contractual
obligation stops at the payment of a monetary sum: "[T]he insurer
is not promising to compensate the insured for an actual ... loss
in exchange for the relatively small, individual premium paid by
the insured. Rather, the insurer is assuming the risk that death
or property loss may occur . .. "141 The court went on to state
that the "foundation of insurance is therefore risk distribution." 42
Texas Association of Schools also illustrates the proposition
that insurance contracts are contracts of "indemnity." 43 The term
"indemnity" encompasses two general ideas: "(1) providing
security, such as through the execution and delivery of a bond;
and (2) providing compensation for actual damage that has
occurred." 144  It is economic security arising from the
indemnification obligation, but existing independent of the actual
indemnification payment, that Texas Association of Schools
referred to when it rejected the notion that the insurer's
contractual obligation stops at the payment of a sum. 145 The
Rhode Island Superior Court, on the other hand, took the opposite
138. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6.
139. GTE RE conceded that as a solvent company it would be able to meet
its liability in full if it remained in run-off. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 9.
140. 169 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2005).
141. Id. at 658 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id. at 659.
143. See 169 S.W.3d at 655. See also PLITT, supra note 83, at § 1:7
(explaining the concept of "indemnity").
144. PLITT, supra note 83, at § 1:7.
145. See 169 S.W.3d at 658.
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approach, and conflated the indemnification payment with GTE
RE's indemnification obligation.146
The security provided by an insurer or reinsurer's
indemnification obligation, however, is only a benefit insofar as
the insured can rely on the insurance product's capacity to protect
it from the uncertainty of pure risk. The existence of solvent
schemes of arrangement frustrates the insured's expectations of
security by undermining insurance products' reliability. 147 Now
that insurance's risk-transfer function has been examined as an
essential element of an insurance contract, this article will explore
how solvent schemes of arrangement substantially impair this by
infringing upon the insured's expectations of economic security.
IV. How AN INSURED'S CONTRACTUAL EXPECTATIONS ARE FRUSTRATED
BY SOLVENT SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT
A commutation plan reallocates the risk from the insurer or
reinsurer, who had agreed to bear the risk, back to the
policyholder. As such, dissenting policyholders lose the economic
security afforded by the risk-transfer of the original insurance or
reinsurance contract. 148 For parties like Hudson that face large
contingent IBNR liabilities, this is a particularly precarious
situation.
A. In Re British Aviation Insurance Company Ltd.
In In re British Aviation Insurance Co. Ltd., the United
Kingdom's High Court addressed a situation similar to that faced
by Hudson. 149 Although the petition was ultimately thrown out
on procedural grounds, Justice Lewison's remarks illustrate why
courts should examine the totality of the circumstances
146. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at
15-16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011) (implying that GTE RE's contractual
obligations stopped upon the payment of a monetary sum to Hudson). Cf Tex.
Ass'n of Sch., 169 S.W.3d at 658 (rejecting the notion that an insurer's
contractual obligations necessarily end upon the payment of a monetary
sum).
147. This concept, as well as the importance of maintaining reliable
insurance products will be explained more completely in Part IV.
148. See generally discussion infra Part IV.A.
149. [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.) (Eng.). See also Scottish Lion Ins. Co. Ltd.
v. Goodrich Corp., [2009] S.C. 349 (Scot.) (holding that a solvent scheme "is
an instance of where . .. creditor democracy should not carry the day").
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surrounding each insured to best determine whether a
commutation plan will frustrate its contractual expectations. 150
1. The Strikingly Similar Facts of British Aviation
The British Aviation Insurance Company provided insurance
and reinsurance to companies in the aviation sector until it went
into run-off in 2002.151 Aircraft manufacturers had used asbestos
in aircraft manufacturing until the 1980s and, as a result, British
Aviation's potential liabilities arose from claims brought by U.S.
policyholders who faced liability under product liability, toxic tort,
pollution and asbestos claims.152 These liabilities were written on
occurrence-based policies.1 53  As a result, the policies had
substantial value to the objecting insureds because of the broad
coverage and security they provided against contingent IBNR
losses. 154
The objecting insureds' attorney argued that "[t]he proposed
[s]cheme involve[d] the re-writing of contracts freely entered into
by the Company and the withdrawal of the cover the policyholders
bargained for." 5 5 The actuary, who was the "principal architect"
of the estimation utilized by British Aviation's commutation plan,
even noted that "[e]stimation of asbestos related IBNR claims
involves a valuation of future contingent liabilities and is,
therefore inherently uncertain.... I accept that wide variations
might be experienced." 56  The fact that the occurrence-based
policies covered long-tail liabilities created this inherent
uncertainty in the valuation. 5 7 Dr. Rabinovitz, an expert for the
150. See In re British Aviation Ins. Co. Ltd., [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch)
(Eng.).
151. Id. 1.
152. Id. 3.
153. Id. 8. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining
the nature and distinguishing feature of occurrence-based policies).
154. One of the reasons the reinsurance treaties in British Aviation were
valuable to the objecting creditors was the security they provided against
contingent IBNR claims, similar to the certainty provided to Hudson by the
GTE RE reinsurance treaty. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum,
supra note 12, at 4 (explaining that GTE RE was liable under the
reinsurance treaty for "all losses occurring prior to January 1, 1987').
155. In re British Aviation Ins. Co. Ltd., [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.) [511
(Eng.).
156. Id. 1 18.
157. Id. 14.
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objecting insureds noted that "[n]ew asbestos claims, caused by
exposures from the 1940s to the 1970s, are expected to continue to
arise until about 2049; and [some] claims are expected to extend
yet further into the future" as a result of the aviation industry's
use of asbestos well into the 1980s. 5 8
2. British Aviation Insureds' Contractual Expectations
As a result of the actuarial valuation's uncertainty, Justice
Lewison proposed to evaluate the commutation plan by comparing
the insureds' contractual rights and reasonable expectations
should a scheme be put in place with their expectations if British
Aviation remained in run-off.159  Within this evaluation, an
insured, facing substantial IBNR liability, has much higher
expectations of meeting its liabilities through a solvent insurer
that remains in run-off than one that pays a lump-sum to the
insured based upon inherently unreliable actuarial estimates. 160
The Justice noted that the insurer's promise to bear the risk
of the "contingency materializing [" is related to the insured's
expectations. 161  "The insurer is in the risk business; and the
policyholder is not.. . . The essence of the scheme is that it
retransfers the risk from the insurer (who had contracted to bear
it) to the policyholder (who did not)." 62
The Justice then concluded:
In the end ... it seems to me to be unfair to require the
manufacturers who have bought insurance policies
designed to cast the risk of exposure to asbestos claims on
insurers to have that risk compulsorily retransferred to
them. The Company is in the risk business; and they are
not .... The purpose of the scheme is to allow surplus
funds to be returned to shareholders in preference to
satisfying the legitimate claims of creditors. No matter
how usable and reasonable an estimate may be, the very
158. Id. 1 15.
159. Id. 71.
160. See Id. T 83 (speaking of an insured's expectations in terms of its
contractual rights and noting that the rights of a policyholder with IBNR
claims are different under a scheme from the rights it would have in the
absence of a scheme).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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fact that it is an estimate is likely to make i[t] an
inaccurate forecast of the actual liabilities of
policyholders. If individual policyholders wish to
compound the Company's contingent liabilities to them,
and to accept payment in full of an estimate of their
claims, there is nothing to stop them doing so. But to
compel dissentients to do so would ... require them to do
that which is unreasonable ... .1 63
3. British Aviation Applied to Hudson
Justice Lewison focused on the detriment to the British
Aviation insureds' contractual expectations when their risk was
compulsorily shifted back to them in concluding that British
Aviation's commutation plan was unfair.164 The dissentients in
British Aviation faced the prospect of large contingent IBNR
claims. 165 As a result, the lump-sum payment provided by British
Aviation would potentially be insufficient to cover the dissentients'
total liabilities. 166 Justice Lewison believed that this
arrangement deprived the dissentients of the economic security,
originally provided by the insurance contracts, against potential
IBNR liability.167
Hudson faced uncertainty similar to that confronted by the
British Aviation insureds. 168 The lump-sum payment under the
GTE RE commutation plan retransfered the risk of a "contingency
materializing" back to Hudson. 169 The payment deprived Hudson
of the economic security, originally provided by the GTE RE
reinsurance treaty, against IBNR liability that could
materialize.170
163. Id. 143.
164. Id.
165. Id., 3.
166. See id. T 18.
167. See id. T 143.
168. Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4-6
(describing Hudson's significant liability that remained for claims that were
either unsettled or unreported, how the GTE RE reinsurance treaty covered
these liabilities, and why the commutation payment may be insufficient to
replicate the Hudson's coverage that it originally contracted for).
169. In re British Aviation Ins. Co. Ltd., [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.) [83]
(Eng.); Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4-6..
170. See Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12,
at 5 ("If the Plan is approved, the indemnity obligations contained in the
SOLVENT SCHEMES
B. Pireno Revisted: Solvent Schemes of Arrangement and the
Reliability of Insurance Products
Additionally, the availability of solvent schemes of
arrangement undermines the reliability of insurance products.
Recall that the second-prong of Pireno identified the importance of
the contractual agreement to the insured-insurer relationship.171
The sanctity of the contract ensures reliable insurance products
and insurer/insured relations. In Pireno, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress, by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, was
concerned with the "relationship between the insurer and insured,
the type of policy that could be issued, its reliability,
interpretation, and enforcement."172  The availability of solvent
schemes of arrangement threaten the relationship between the
insured and insurer by undermining the reliability of the
insurance contract for an insured who knows its contractual
expectations can be abrogated without its consent.
British Aviation also hinted at the importance of reliable
insurance products. 7 3  A commutation plan that shifts the risk
back to the insured who does not have the opportunity to
redistribute the risk (recall that the court stated that "[t]he
Company is in the risk business; and [the insured is] not") injects
the devastating uncertainty described by Williams and Heins into
the insured-insurer relationship.174  As Hudson discovered,
expectations of economic security become mere figments should
Hudson .. .contracts will be terminated in exchange for an estimate based on
estimates-loss reserve estimates-despite (1) the Odyssey Insureds'
objection to such a substitution and (2) GTE RE's admission that the
estimates may ultimately not be sufficient to cover the risks being forcibly
shifted back to the Odyssey Insureds."). Cf In re British Aviation Ins. Co.
Ltd., [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.) [143] (Eng.).
171. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)
(discussing that an insurance practice must constitute an integral part of the
relationship between the insurer and the insured).
172. Id. at 128 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
173. See In re British Aviation Ins. Co. Ltd., [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.)
[143] (Eng.) (discussing how, in some situations, it would be unfair to allow
an insurer to reallocate the risk it had agreed to assume back to the insured).
174. Id. 143. See WILLAMS & HEINS, supra note 94, at 16-19
(discussing that uncertainty reduces the total satisfaction associated with a
given economic status and has the proclivity to cause inefficiencies in the
utilization of existing capital).
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the insurer or reinsurer choose to enter a solvent scheme of
arrangement.' 7 5 As such, the availability of solvent schemes of
arrangement to solvent insurers may cause a potential insured to
question whether a policy is a sound investment and could lead to
a more risk-averse society.176
The issues that solvent schemes of arrangement present for
insureds' contractual expectations, as well as the reliability of
insurance products, mandates a more thorough analysis than that
provided by the GTE Reinsurance court. The next section will
articulate a new framework within which courts can condition
solvent schemes of arrangement to comply with insureds'
contractual expectations.
V. CONDITIONING SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR EXAMINING AN INSURED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED
Contract Clause jurisprudence has consistently emphasized
that a party's contractual expectations are important, and that an
ex post facto law that substantially impairs these expectations
will violate the Contract Clause.' 7 7  GTE Reinsurance creates a
dangerous precedent insofar as it stands for the proposition that a
court-sanctioned solvent scheme of arrangement need not be
conditioned upon an insured's contractual expectations as they
relate to considerations of risk-transfer and the economic security
that arises therefrom. 7 8  As such, a court should examine the
totality of the circumstances surrounding a dissenting insured's
contractual expectations before sanctioning a solvent scheme of
arrangement. Should a court determine that a dissenting
insured's contractual expectations have been impaired, the
dissenting insured should be allowed to opt out of the
commutation plan.
A proper consideration of an insured's expectations must go
beyond whether a sum of money is paid. It must also examine (1)
175. A solvent scheme may operate to withdraw the cover insureds had
contracted for. See In re British Aviation Ins. Co. Ltd., [2005] EWHC
1621(Ch.) [51] (Eng.).
176. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the economic importance
of insurance in light of the attitude of risk-aversion created by uncertainty).
177. See generally supra Part I.D.
178. See generally supra Part III.
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the insured's ability to transfer and re-distribute its risk and
obtain substantially similar coverage from another insurer or
reinsurer should a commutation plan be enforced; (2) the solvency
of the commuting party; and (3) the solvency of the insured, and
its potential for IBNR liability. 179  These considerations are
compatible with Jordan, Pireno, and British Aviation, as they
consider the reliability of the insurance product and the
relationship between the insurer and insured. 8 0  Most
importantly, as per British Aviation, this analysis compels a court
to comply with insureds' expectations before sanctioning a solvent
scheme of arrangement because it requires the court to compare
insureds' expectations under a commutation plan with their
expectations should the insurer remain in run-off.181
The aforementioned considerations are important because
they are intimately related to the insured's contractual
expectations. An insured's ability to seek substantially similar
coverage will provide it the same economic security it had under
the original policies, while still allowing the insurer to enter a
solvent scheme of arrangement.182 The solvency of the insurer or
reinsurer is also important because a commuting party's level of
solvency-i.e., if a company is moderately solvent-may determine
whether an insured's expectations are better served by a
commuting insurer, who is protected against insolvency, than an
179. "There is a wide disparity in the circumstances of companies that
enter run-off," and this disparity mandates a close scrutiny of a company's
situation and how it relates to an insured's contractual expectations. See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 4. Some companies, like GTE RE, do not
pose the risk of becoming insolvent. The situation in which a substantially
solvent insurer or reinsurer seeks to commute its liabilities negates many of
the benefits associated with solvent schemes of arrangement such as
certainty of payment to creditors, deteriorating reinsurance collections
avoidance, and prevention of unfairness amongst creditor collections. These
benefits often exist only where the insurer or reinsurer is only marginally
solvent. At the same time, however, the commutation of a substantially
solvent insurer or reinsurer can create the contractual issues discussed in
this piece. See Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12,
at9.
180. See supra Part IV.B.
181. Id.
182. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 9 (proposing that a substantially
solvent run-off entity be allowed to enter into a scheme so long as it
substitutes the insureds' current contract with one from a company of equal
or greater financial strength).
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insurer that remains in run-off and later becomes insolvent or
marginally solvent. 183 Furthermore, the solvency of the insured,
and its potential IBNR liability, substantially raises the insured's
expectations for economic security because of the breadth of the
insurer's indemnification obligation compared to the potentially
insufficient commutation payment. 184 Should an insured face a
position similar to Hudson's, it should be exempt from further
commutation proceedings and have the option to elect to collect
from the insurer or reinsurer in the ordinary fashion.
Because the insureds' contractual expectations are of
paramount importance, it is imperative that courts consider
alternative solutions that comply with those expectations before
sanctioning a solvent scheme of arrangement. The
aforementioned framework would require more judicial discretion
for conditioning a solvent scheme of arrangement than that
currently necessitated by Rhode Island's Restructuring Act, but it
is possible, and such a solution has been discussed by at least one
state.185 A Connecticut task force addressed alternative theories
of debt restructuring that comply with a dissenting insured's
contractual expectations.
The Task Force discussed at length the concerns associated
with the traditional majority-rule feature of solvent schemes of
arrangement, and stated that objecting creditors "should have an
alternative to compulsory estimation of their claims" if a
commuting company is substantially solvent. 186  One such
alternative would allow objecting policyholders to present and
183. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at
30 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011) (noting that the benefit of the Restructuring
Act is that it provides some certainty of payment to creditors); see also supra
note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the greater regulatory oversight
needed for marginally-solvent companies in run-off).
184. No court has recognized a method of valuation that completely
eliminates conjecture in the calculation of IBNR liabilities. See Odyssey
Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 11. Furthermore,
GTE RE had total liabilities of $56,466,962, total assets of $92,412,487 and a
total surplus of $35,945,525 and acknowledged there was no danger it would
be unable to meet its contractual obligations. Id. at 9-10.
185. In 2006 Susan F. Cogswell, Insurance Commissioner of the State of
Connecticut, established a task force to study the need for laws regulating
run-off companies. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
186. Id. at 8.
SOLVENT SCHEMES
collect their claims in the ordinary course. 187 A second possibility
would require the run-off company to transfer the policies to
another company of equal or greater financial strength as the run-
off company. 188 Both of these options would give the insured the
choice as to how best to protect its financial assets-either by
retransferring the risk back onto itself, or maintaining the
insurance agreement-without an unwarranted, compulsory
reallocation of its risk as determined by a majority of creditors. 8 9
Yet, it is true that solvent schemes of arrangement do provide
important public benefits to Rhode Island such as fostering its
economic growth by attracting large insurance companies. 190
Recall that under the Contract Clause, a state legislature's
motivation to carry out an important public purpose can
withstand Contract Clause scrutiny.19 1  The public purpose
exception, some might agree, would nullify any need to modify the
Restructuring Act to allow for judicial contemplation of insureds'
contractual expectations. However, the next section will explain
that the Rhode Island General Assembly's intention to make
Rhode Island an attractive state for insurance companies is
insufficient to justify a substantial impairment of insureds'
contractual expectations.
VI. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
AS A CONTRACT CLAUSE EXCEPTION
In 1995, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond developed
the Governors Insurance Task Force because he believed the
insurance industry could promote the economic growth of the
state. 192 The GTE Reinsurance court assumed economic growth
was a public purpose sufficient to warrant the impairment of the
contract held by Hudson.193 The court noted, "a statute will be
187. Id. at 9.
188. Id.
189. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.5-1 to -6 (2008).
190. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at
30 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011).
191. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 441-43
(1934).
192. See R.I. Exec. Order No. 95-21 (Aug. 22, 1995) available at
http://www.library.state.ri.us/publications/governorlexecutiveorders/1995/95e
xec2l.pdf.
193. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 30.
2012] 473
474 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:439
deemed constitutional, despite any substantial impairment, where
a state establishes that the regulation is justified by a significant
and legitimate public purpose."l 94 However, the court's decision
ignores the deference that the Supreme Court has given to
insurance and insurance-like agreements where impairment will
result in increased financial liability.195  Furthermore, because
insurance contracts are important vehicles for economic growth,
the economic environment of Rhode Island is better preserved by
efforts that maintain the reliability of insurance products.196
Allied Structural Steel demonstrates the Supreme Court's
hesitancy to allow a state legislature to enact legislation that
abrogates private contracts where the abrogation of said contracts
could result in liability in "potentially disabling amounts."1 97
Allied Steel had established a pension trust fund for employees to
which the company was the sole contributor.198 The contributions
to the fund were based on actuarial predictions of eventual payout
needs and, once those payments were made, they were
irrevocable. 199 Allied Steel, however, had no obligation to make
specific contributions.200  In fact, the plan stated that "[n]o
employee shall have any right to, or interest in, any part of the
Trust's assets upon termination of his employment or otherwise,
except as provided from time to time under this Plan."201
Subsequent to this arrangement, Minnesota enacted the
Private Pension Benefits Protection Act to address the problem of
plant closure and pension plan termination.202  That Act
mandated that a private employer of 100 or more employees, who
already provided pension benefits under a plan meeting § 401 of
the Internal Revenue Code, was subject to a "pension funding
194. Id at 28. (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light
Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)).
195. Id.; see, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234
(1978); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
196. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B. (discussing the economic
benefits of insurance and the detrimental impact solvent schemes of
arrangement can have on the reliability of insurance products).
197. 438 U.S. at 247; see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. , 431 U.S. at 19
(discussing the importance of security provisions in contracts).
198. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 236-39.
199. Id. at 237.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id at 238, 247-48.
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charge" if the company either terminated the plan or closed its
Minnesota office. 203  In 1974, Allied Steel closed its Minnesota
office and discharged eleven of its thirty Minnesota employees. 204
Nine of the employees did not have vested pension rights.205 On
August 18, 1974, Minnesota notified Allied Steel that it owed
$185,000 under the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act. 206
After that, Allied Steel filed suit and claimed the Act was an
unconstitutional impairment of its contractual obligations with its
employees under the private pension agreement. 207
The Supreme Court struck down the Pension Benefits
Protection Act as unconstitutional and emphasized the importance
of Allied Steel's contractual expectations under its private pension
fund.208  The Court noted that "[t]he company's maximum
obligation was to set aside each year an amount based on the
plan's requirements for vesting. .. . It relied heavily, and
reasonably, on this legitimate contractual expectation in
calculating its annual contributions to the pension fund."209 The
Court also acknowledged Allied Steel's heavy reliance on the
contractual terms of the private pension agreement: "a basic term
of the pension contract-one on which the company had relied for
10 years-was substantially modified."210  The Court further
stated:
These [pension] plans, like other forms of insurance,
depend on the accumulation of large sums to cover
contingencies. The amounts set aside are determined by
a painstaking assessment of the insurer's likely liability.
Risks that the insurer foresees will be included in the
calculation of liability, and the rates or contributions
charged will reflect that calculation. The occurrence of
major unforeseen contingencies, however, jeopardizes the
insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insureds' benefits.
Drastic changes in the legal rules governing pension and
203. Id.
204. Id. at 239.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 239-40.
208. See id. at 246.
209. Id. at 245-46.
210. Id. at 246.
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insurance funds, like other unforeseen events, can have
this effect. 211
The Court then concluded that the Private Pension Benefits
Protection Act would have the effect of imposing unexpected
liability in "potentially disabling amounts" on Allied Steel, and the
Minnesota state legislature's intention to boost the state's
economy, by fixing the problem of plant closure and pension plan
termination, was not an economic or social problem sufficient to
survive Contract Clause scrutiny. 212
A. The Importance of Economic Security Under the Contract
Clause
It is important to note the analogy that the Allied Steel Court
drew between pension funds and insurance. 213 Just like Allied
Steel, Hudson's economic security hinges upon the accumulation
of large sums to cover contingencies should the coverage it
contracted for be commuted, and the amount of coverage Hudson
bargained for was accomplished through an assessment of its
likely liability.214  The imposition of the GTE RE commutation
plan, combined with Hudson's estimate of its IBNR liability, could
have the effect of imposing unexpected liability in "potentially
disabling amounts." 215  Furthermore, just as Allied Steel's
solvency would be jeopardized by the occurrence of major
unforeseen liabilities in the absence of its private pension fund, so
too would Hudson's solvency be jeopardized by the occurrence of
major unforeseen IBNR liability should the reinsurance it
bargained for be abrogated.2 16
211. Id. at 246-47 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. at 247-48.
213. See id. at 246-47.
214. See Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12,
at 8 ("Although both parties to a reinsurance transaction utilize actuarial
assessments of risk, the decision to purchase reinsurance and the decision to
provide reinsurance are also based on numerous other factors such as each
party's tolerance for risk and its desire to diversify the risk it holds.").
215. See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 247; Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 12.
216. See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 246-47; Odyssey Insureds' Supplemental
Memorandum, supra note 12, at 12 (discussing the potential for unforeseen
liabilities that could impact Hudson's solvency: "If some new 'unknown'
appears-a new wave of environmental or mass tort claims, for example-the
exposure could be enormous. History teaches that they do arise, with
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B. A State's Economic Well-Being Cannot Come at the Detriment
of a Private Company's Economic Security
The Supreme Court in Allied Steel also dismissed the
Minnesota legislature's intended purpose of boosting its economy.
The Court stated that "[i]f the Contract Clause is to retain any
meaning at all. . . it must be understood to impose some limits
upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual
relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate
police power."217 It then noted that Minnesota's intent to boost its
economy by fixing plant closure was not sufficient to withstand
Contract Clause scrutiny. 218  In GTE Reinsurance, the Rhode
Island Superior Court noted:
[T]he underlying goal of the Task Force was to stimulate
Rhode Island's economy by attracting segments of the
insurance industry to the State. . . . [T]he Restructuring
Act ... achieves Governor Almond's original objective of
making Rhode Island an attractive location for insurance
companies-whether or not they are in run-off-and
encouraging economic growth .... 2 19
Yet there is no significant difference between the Rhode Island
General Assembly's purpose of attracting new jobs to Rhode
Island and Minnesota's attempt to stop plant closures. Further,
the Restructuring Act does not seek to remedy an economic
depression, like the mortgage moratorium law in Blaisdell.220
Rather, its purpose is to make "Rhode Island an attractive location
for insurance companies" in order to stimulate its economic
growth.221 In doing so, the state is also able to collect a handsome
catastrophic consequences. Asbestos, environmental claims, mold, lead,
latex, terrorism, and cyber liability are all recent examples. It is indisputable
that whatever estimate either party makes now will, once all of the current
and future claims have been paid, be wrong.").
217. 438 U.S. at 242.
218. Id at 249.
219. In re GTE Reinsurance Co. Ltd., No. C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at
29-30 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011).
220. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 423 (1934).
221. The Rhode Island Superior Court also noted that the Restructuring
Act allowed Rhode Island to address issues endemic to the insurance industry
but protecting creditors from the harms of insurance companies in run-off. In
re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 34. However, as this
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fee from the commuting company.2 22  Allied Steel, however,
discloses that a state legislature's attempt to boost its state's
economy, absent an exigent circumstance, is insufficient to
withstand Contract Clause scrutiny.223
VII. CONCLUSION
A solvent scheme of arrangement is a beneficial tool to
insurers and reinsurers who wish to restructure debt obligations
with policyholders. These schemes allow an insurer or reinsurer
to avoid a lengthy run-off process and limit administrative
costs.224  They further allow an insurer to efficiently deploy
capital, once tied-up in run-off, to non-run-off operations. 225 For
marginally solvent companies, solvent schemes of arrangement
offer the best opportunity to remain solvent. 226
However, GTE Reinsurance illustrates how a substantially
solvent company can manipulate a law, like Rhode Island's
Restructuring Act, to abrogate dissenting insureds' contractual
expectations for its own convenience. Such state-sanctioned
abrogation can create a substantial impairment of the insured's
contractual expectations under the Contract Clause.227  The
economic benefits associated with the transfer of risk allowed by
an insurance contract, like the insureds ability to assume
speculative risks and accumulate new capital, are lost as the
insured is forced to set aside large accumulations of wealth to
handle its own pure risk.228 In the aggregate, this affects the
note has disclosed, in situations involving a substantially solvent insurer, a
creditor may be better protected by allowing a court to consider an objecting
creditors right of rejection in light of its contractual expectations.
222. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.5-5 (2008); see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (noting that complete deference to a
legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity with respect to
determining whether a law is passed for an important public purpose is not
appropriate where the State's self-interest is at stake: "A governmental
entity can always find a use for extra money.").
223. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978).
See also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 441-43
224. In re GTE Reinsurance, C.A. No. PB 10-3777, slip op. at 33.
225. Id.
226. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 6 (stating that greater
regulatory oversight is appropriate for marginally solvent companies who
have a much higher potential for insolvency if a run-off is not successful).
227. See discussion supra Parts I.D, V.
228. See discussion supra Part III.
SOLVENT SCHEMES
reliability of insurance products by causing companies to question
the soundness of their insurance investment and can lead to a
more risk-averse society.2 29
To combat the potential dangers associated with traditional
solvent scheme laws, this note has presented an analysis by which
courts should condition solvent schemes of arrangement to comply
with dissenting insureds' contractual expectations of economic
security. Such an analysis would eliminate the majority-rule
feature of Rhode Island's Restructuring Act through an
examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding each
insured's policy and financial situation.230
Through this analysis a court can ensure that an insured's
contractual expectations are best maintained by conditioning the
solvent scheme of arrangement on the dissenting-insured's ability
to "opt-out" of the commutation plan. This, in turn, will promote
certainty in the execution of insurance contracts and extinguish
the negative impact schemes pose to the reliability of insurance
products. Under this newly proposed framework, the judiciary's
increased scrutiny of insurers, which are seeking to enter a
solvent scheme of arrangement, will continue to ensure that
insurance contracts act as reliable vehicles for economic growth.
229. See discussion supra Part III.B.
230. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-14.5-1 to -6 (2008).
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